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The outbreaks of Avian Influenza H5N1 the recent years has increased our attention to a 
possible Pandemic Influenza. Mindful of the last century's pandemics, we fear that changes in 
the virus' surface antigens can cause a new virus capable of transmitting between humans. 
Statisticians use mathematical modelling as an instrument for predicting the pattern and 
intensity of the spreading of a pandemic; models can also help estimating the effects of 
measures such as antiviral drugs, vaccination and quarantines. Though simplified models have 
their limitations, it is obvious that even simple models can be a powerful tool in pandemic 
preparations. How should the governments and health care workers prepare for a possible 
pandemic? A lot of studies try to answer this, some using mathematical modelling. In this 
paper, I will review some of the debate on this subject. It seems to be generally agreed that we 
still need to learn more about influenza, and the WHO urges all countries to prepare plans for 
the handling of a possible pandemic. Secondly, I report the results of attempts to estimate R0-
values from outbreaks of Norwegian seasonal influenza epidemics. My estimations show 
expected values of R0, but unexpectedly small values of latency and infectious periods. 
Finally, I have made an SEIR-model to simulate a possible pandemic, illustrating how 











Influenza virus is a virus in the orthomyxoviridea family. To replicate, all virus depend on the 
machinery and metabolism of cells in other organisms. Virus have developed ways to enter 
and infect cells, while organisms have evolved defence mechanisms to withstand infection. 
In fact, the species and microbes are involved in the same coevolutionary struggle, sometimes 
called 'a war', to develop the best mechanisms of replication and survival (24). 
 Because of the ability of the immune defence to change and adapt to pathogens, and 
then memorize that specific pathogen, the microbes are also forced to constantly change their 
pathogenicity to survive. Influenza viruses is continuously subjected to antigenic drift, i.e. 
mutations in the viral genome as the virus' genetic material is being reproduced inside 
infected host cells. Most of these mutations are largely deleterious and the resulting virus will 
not be able to replicate (1). But some mutations improve the virus' survival and the more 'fit' 
virus will spread more easily in and between hosts, possibly to other species or survive in 
reservoirs.  
 Viral evolution is also dependent on another important mechanism. When different 
virus strains co-exist in an individual or animal, there might be reassortment and 
recombination of viral genomes (25, 29). This is called antigenic shifts, and may lead to a 
new virus subtype with dramatically altered pathogenicity.  
 The two major influenza virus subtypes affecting humans are Influenza A and 
Influenza B. Influenza B viruses is only present in human population (12, 25), and represent 
far less numerous subtypes than influenza A. Antigenic shifts has never been seen, nor has 
surface antigenic diversity (30). Hence, there are less options for a major antigenic change 
leading to a subtype with pandemic potential. Influenza A virus, on the other hand, has a large 
natural reservoir in wild waterfowl, and also infects a variety of other species, including birds, 
domesticated fowl and poultry, pigs, horses, dogs and humans. The terminology and 
classification of Influenza A virus is based on its two most important surface antigens. 
Haemagglutinin (HA) is the viral attachment protein, it promotes attachment to the cell and 
entry into the cell by fusion of the cell membrane and the viral sheath. Neuraminidase (NA) 
cleaves proteins on the virus' surface and prevents clustering of viruses, cleaves proteins on 
the surfaces of cells and permits the spreading of newly synthesized virus (8). A total of 16 
antigenically distinct variants of HA and 9 of NA has been identified (10). Influenza H5N1, 
for example, is influenza A virus with HA type 5 and NA type 1. In addition to HA and NA 
genes, influenza A virus also has 6 other genomic segments each coding for a protein of 
substantial importance for the virus' function.  
 Mutations, reassortments and recombinations in these different genomic segments, 
primarily in the HA and NA genes, lead to a rapid emergence of new viral subtypes, and a 
vast amount of different co-circulating subtypes, in many different species. When discussing 
today's pandemic threat, it is practical to distinguish tree categories of influenza: Human 




HUMAN EPIDEMIC INFLUENZA 
 
Often referred to as seasonal influenza, epidemic influenza is a well known disease; millions 
of cases reported each year, and an estimated yearly excess death toll of about 50 000 in the 
USA (16, 17). In Norway, the yearly excess death toll is estimated to 1300 (34). An epidemic 
is the occurrence in a community or region of a disease or condition clearly in excess of 
normal expectancy (33). The influenza epidemics are caused by Influenza A or Influenza B 
viruses, which is transmitted by droplets escaping the carrier by sneezing, coughing or 
breathing and then inhaled by another person. 
Human influenza occur all over the world, in temperate countries as winter epidemics, in 
tropical regions as all-season epidemics. Because of viral evolution, different subtypes will 
dominate from season to season, each presenting different pathogenicity, resulting in varying 
size and intensity of the outbreaks. The three pandemics of the last century each introduced a 
novel subtype to circulate the following years. The H3N2 virus, for example, introduced as 
the Hong Kong Flu of 1968, is known to be among the more pathogenic (13). The circulation 
of H3N2 has often been associated with more severe disease and with excess pneumonia and 
influenza mortality (31). In individuals having gone through an infection, immunity often 
persists, at least partly, during the following few years (9). A vaccine is manufactured each 
year, based on which viral subtypes the scientists and researchers believe will be causing the 
next seasons epidemic. The surveillance work of The World Health Organization (WHO) and 
national centres for disease control and prevention is important in this process. Vaccines are 
administered to individuals prone to complications from influenza infection (e.g. people with 
chronic medical conditions or people older than 65 years) and to groups susceptible to 
infection and spreading (health care workers, teachers and others with many contacts). The 
vaccine will only yield partial immunity, depending on how well the WHO-decided strains 
used in vaccine production correspond to the subtypes eventually dominating that seasons 
outbreak. Antiviral medication is also important in fighting complications amongst the weak 





Avian influenza is caused by influenza A virus subtypes transmissible between birds. These 
viruses are normally present in many wild birds without causing disease, especially wade 
birds and ducks, while domesticated birds such as chickens, hens and turkeys are most 
vulnerable to disease. Indeed, avian influenza has caused an estimated loss of more than 250 
million birds in the poultry industry, including those killed by humans in attempt to stop the 
spread (20). There has been outbreaks in 46 different countries. The route of transmission is 
by droplets/secrete between birds, and possibly through the faecal-oral route. Only a few 
subtypes have been able to become established in mammalian hosts, probably largely because 
of differences in receptor preferences (20, 25), discussed in the next paragraph.  
 The H5N1 influenza virus has been circulating in South-East Asia since 1997 and 
reached Europe in 2005 (9, 18). This subtype seem to cross the species barrier more readily 
(20), and until September 25th 2007 there had been 328 reported human cases in 12 different 
countries in Asia and Africa (28). The symptoms range from typical influenza symptoms - 
fever, cough, sore throat, muscle aches, eye infection, to more severe complications such as 
pneumonia, respiratory distress, diarrhea and multi organ failure (18,22,23). Many infected 
cases has received medical treatment, including the antivirals oseltamivir and zanamivir, 
antibiotics and fungicides against secondary infections and further therapy against systemic 
complications. Still mortality is high; H5N1 has caused 200 deaths, and most of them were 
young and otherwise healthy adults (20, 28). Infected persons have all been living close to 
birds and poultry, as working in markets with living chickens, participating in slaughtering, 






History reveals many examples of devastating plagues, epidemics and pandemics. A 
pandemic is a disease occurring over a wide geographical area and affecting an exceptionally 
high proportion of the population (33). It can occur when a virus transmissible between 
humans meets a population where few or no individuals are immune. Last century, the world 
witnessed three great influenza pandemics. The Spanish Flu from 1918 to 1920 probably 
affected more than half the worlds population of about two billions (14), caused an estimated 
50 million excess deaths worldwide (25), and 13000 – 15000 excess deaths in Norway (2). 
The Asia Flu (1957-58) caused an estimated 1 million deaths, and the Hong Kong Flu (1968-
70) at least 700,000 excess deaths (35). There was also at least three major epidemics, but too 
small to be called pandemics: a pseudopandemic in 1947 with low death rates, an epidemic 
called The Russian Flu in 1977 that was a pandemic in children, and an abortive epidemic of 
swine influenza in 1976 that was feared to have pandemic potential (13). 
 To enter respiratory epithelial cells, influenza virus' surface antigen haemagglutinin 
(HA) binds to receptor molecules on the cell surface. For instance, human epidemic influenza 
viruses bind to respiratory cell receptors named sialic acid (SA) α-2,6-Gal-terminated 
saccharides abundant in the upper airways. Avian influenza virus, on the other hand, prefers 
SA α-2,3-Gal-terminated saccharides, in humans only abundant in the lower airways (1). This 
explains why avian virus, including H5N1, does not readily infect humans (20, 25). It might 
also explain the relatively high proportions of fatal pneumonia among H5N1 infected 
individuals (1, 25). Today's fear of pandemic influenza is primarily based on the fact that 
H5N1 could change its specificity to cell receptors in the upper respiratory tract through 
changes in the HA-gene. Such an antigenic shift, leading to a novel subtype of antigen on the 
surface of the virus can be caused by reassortment between avian and human influenza virus 
in the large reservoir of influenza viruses in waterfowl. It could also for example happen in 
swine, where infections with both human and avian subtypes occur (25). This mechanism, by 
which the virus can jump the "species barrier" is in fact believed to be the cause of the last 
century's three great pandemics. The introduction of human transmissible HA subtype 1 (H1) 
led to The Spanish Flu in 1918. Similarly, the introduction of subtype H2 led to The Asia Flu 
in 1957 and H3 to the The Hong Kong Flu in 1968 (3, 13). Some scientist, however, suggest 
the Spanish Flu resulted from adaptive mutations (25).  
 In theory, any avian virus might evolve to gaining transmissibility between humans. If 
such a virus emerges, the chances are big that few or no people would be immune, because of 
the lack of similarity with circulating human epidemic virus. Depending on the virus' ability 
to cause disease in humans it might lead to a pandemic. And depending on how well the 
society and its governments handle this threat, it could end as a highly pathogenic influenza 
pandemic causing substantial morbidity and mortality. The ongoing outbreaks of avian 
influenza H5N1 in Asia, and the sporadic human infections show that this virus probably is 
the one with biggest pandemic potential. The many million birds and some hundred humans 
infected with H5N1 the recent years has again drawn attention to the pandemic threat. 
According to some sources, it is inevitable that another influenza pandemic will occur (7) - it 
is merely a question of time.  
The WHO and many national health authorities is constantly monitoring the 
corresponding threat of an influenza pandemic. A worldwide network, established by the 
WHO, handles the surveillance of epidemic influenza, human cases of avian influenza and the 
genetic evolution of the H5N1 virus. The goal of this surveillance is to identify new emerging 
viral subtypes, to learn more about the influenza viruses and to contribute to the selection of 
appropriate vaccine strains (28). The WHO and many national health authorities have also 
made detailed pandemic preparedness plans, to assure organized efforts to handle a pandemic. 
But because of today's high rate of travelling between cities and countries it will be 
challenging to contain and stop such a spread and it could easily affect hundreds of millions 






Preparing for a possible pandemic influenza is an important task involving people from many 
different professions - epidemiologists, statisticians, virologists, immunologists, health care 
workers and politicians among others. Mathematical modelling is a powerful tool in the field 
of emerging infectious diseases. Models of society is designed to represent the contact pattern 
between individuals and knowledge about the pathogens is applied to help understanding and 
predicting the spread. 
 There are many different ways to do mathematical modelling of infectious disease. 
The classic model is the SIR model, and its analogues. The SIR model has three states: S for 
susceptibles, I for infectious and R for removed or recovered. At any given time, there is a 
certain number of persons in each state. Alternatively, each state can have a certain proportion 
of the total population. The susceptibles consist of individuals who can catch the disease, 
while the infectious are the ones with disease capable of infecting the susceptibles. 
Individuals no longer infectious move to the removed state, either by recovering and gaining 
immunity, die, or for example be placed in quarantine. Simple SIR models often deals with a 
constant population, no births or deaths are taken into account, and the R state is then usually 
called 'recovered'.  
 The SIR models are deterministic: An individual can only move from one state to the 
next and a set of differential equations describe how these movements occur as a function of 
time. The model is commonly dependant on two variables: the contact rate and the length of 
the infectious period. The contact rate is the product of the number of contacts per person per 
day and the average probability that a contact is sufficient for transmitting disease. Put 
another way, it is the average number of adequate contacts per person per day, where an 
adequate contact is a contact sufficient for transmission of the pathogen. This will vary among 
different individuals, populations and pathogens. To get unique solutions when calculating the 
differential equations, one also must give initial values for each of the states, e.g. the number 
of persons in each state at the beginning of the simulation. 
 All individuals are thought to have constant and average contact patterns and rates, 
and each individual is thought to have the same infectious period. Understandably, this is a 
major simplification of society and biology; in reality, contact patterns and inter-individual 
differences are unimaginably complex. However, models are always simplifications of reality, 
and the more complex a model is, the harder it is to understand. In the field of mathematical 
modelling of infectious disease, more sophisticated models are usually applied. One example 
is SIR-like models with multiple states and different subpopulations; another is network-
modelling, which applies a more realistic representation of peoples contact patterns. Complex 
models is often stochastic, in which there are probabilities at each time step of moving from 
one epidemiological class to another. The presentations of such models, however, is beyond 
the scope of this paper. 
 A crucial quantity in modelling infectious spread is R0 – the basic reproductive 
number. It is defined as the average number of secondary cases infected by a randomly 
selected infected individual introduced in a fully susceptible population. In a SIR model, R0 is 
the product of the contact rate and the length of the infectious period. If R0 > 1, the outbreak 
will possibly lead to an epidemic, while if R0 < 1 it will 'die' out. The higher the R0, the more 
rapidly the epidemic evolves and the more individuals will be infected. In humans, the current 
H5N1 virus has an R0 < 1, as it is not known to transmit between humans. A typical seasonal 
influenza H3N2 has an estimated R0 of about 1.3 (15), while estimates for R0 under the 
Spanish Flu range from 1.8 (5) to 2.9 and between 3 and 4 (27).  
 R0 depends on biological features of the pathogen and the susceptible hosts, but also 
on the contact pattern in the susceptible population. Consequently, a single pathogen will 
have different R0 values depending on the chosen population or subpopulation (26). Because 
of their positions or social behaviour, some people have contact patterns far above the 
average, these are often referred to as superspreaders. If initially involving many 
superspreaders, an infection might spread fast and far, even if the average R0 is low (1). As an 
epidemic evolves, some people will gain immunity, some will die, some might have immunity 
after vaccination, some protection through medication, some will be isolated, others will 
reduce their contact patterns; a lot of factors affect the numbers of secondary cases each 
infected will cause. In addition, during an epidemic, the pathogen itself will change; the way 
we change our behaviour will in turn influence the viral evolution. As the number of 
secondary infections change from case to case during the outbreak there is a quantity called R 
– the replacement number. This is the average number of secondary infections produced by an 
infectious throughout the whole outbreak. Although interesting, R cannot be calculated or 
estimated until the end of the outbreak because it depends on how the outbreak develops. 
 For the reasons stated above, R0 remains a theoretical value. According to its 
definition, it deals only with the very first round of spread in the population. Still, it is of great 
value; it is one of the few ways to quantify the potency of an infectious disease to spread in a 
population. The R0 of a not yet emerged pandemic influenza virus is of course not known. 
But analysis of earlier pandemics and surveillance of the viral genomes and the mechanisms 
of mutations can provide estimates. 
 
After having presented the SIR model and the concept of R0, I will give a give a short 
mathematical presentation of the SEIR model. It is similar to the SIR model, but has one 
additional state. Later in this paper, I use the SEIR model in estimations and simulations. 
 
 
The SEIR - model: 
Four states: Susceptibles, Exposed, Infectious and Recovered. 
 




The contact rate, β, is the average number of adequate contacts per person per time unit where 
an adequate contact is a contact sufficient for transmission of the pathogen. ε is the average 
number of individuals leaving E pr unit time; 1/ε is the average length of the latency period. γ 
is the average number of individuals leaving I pr unit time; 1/γ is the average length of the 
infectious period. In such a model, where β and γ are constant, R0 is defined as: 
 R0 = β / γ 
 
Equations: 
The following set of differential equations define the course of the epidemic as a function of 
time, given the variables mentioned above, as well as the initial conditions for each of the 
states. 
s' (t) = - β * i(t)* s(t)  
e' (t) = β * i(t)* s(t) - ε * e(t) 
i' (t) = ε * e(t) - γ * i(t) 
r' (t) = γ * i(t) 
 
Mathematical and statistical programs can solve these equations, and produce solutions to 
simulate different scenarios. 
 
(Reference for this paragraph: (36)) 
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probably only a question of time before it is here. In fact, many articles refer to a new 
pandemic influenza outbreak as when, not if (7). The role of the WHO and Centres for 
Disease Control and Prevention in different countries is central. Many countries have m
detailed pandemic preparedness plans, describing how action should be taken during a 
Pandemic (26). The goal is to contain an outbreak at its source to gain time to produce 
vaccines in massive amounts. Alternatively one must reduce the spread of an already 
pandemic outbreak. In either way, a number of important measures need to be working
swiftly:  
- Effectiv
first cases of a possible pandemic. Isolation and identification of the virus, and determining
properties. 
- Well prepa
isolation, quarantines, etc. 
- Sufficient and available am
prioritization.  
- A well develo
in the long run.  
 It is conve
Vaccination and Social measures. 
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Two classes of an
example amantadine and rimantadine, and the neuraminidase (NA) inhibitors, for examp
oseltamivir and zanamivir. The adamantanes work by targeting and inhibiting a proton 
channel (named M2) in the virus’ surface necessary for replication. When used 
therapeutically, the adamantanes will often cause the influenza viruses to evolve
resistance. This is less often the case if used prophylactically; the amantadines could be used 
as part of a strategy where individuals more prone to infection gets prophylactic treatment to 
prevent illness. This is often referred to as “targeted antiviral prophylaxis” (4). The 
neuraminidase inhibitors, however, are rarely associated with viral resistance and ca
in both therapeutic as well as prophylactic strategies. 
 As the amount of antiviral drugs is limited, the
strategy will most successfully reduce the outbreak. Prophylactic treatment of every person in 
a country, region or even city, will probably be unfeasible because of the vast amounts of 
drugs needed. Most articles conclude that a combination of therapeutic treatment of infecte
cases and targeted antiviral prophylaxis (TAP) is the most effective strategy (4,5,6). There are
different types of TAP. In social targeting, prophylaxis is given to the network of people 
around the infected individual such as family members, friends, classmates, colleagues etc
In geographical targeting, the treatment includes a certain amount of people living 
geographically close to an infected individual. Therapeutic and prophylactic use of a
drugs is one of the first few options to contain or mitigate a pandemic; some countries has 
stockpiled large amounts, mostly oseltamivir, and health officials have made plans for how
they should be distributed. The WHO has an international stockpile of at least 3 million 
treatment courses of the antiviral oseltamivir. These can quickly be flown to the centre of
potential pandemic to start programs of treatment and TAP, and could contribute to contain o
mitigate the outbreak. Especially for poor countries with little or no antiviral drugs of their 
own, such an international stockpile is of great importance (28). South-East Asia has been 
home to most of the human cases of H5N1, and it would not be surprising if the next 
pandemic begins there. But even the WHO stockpile might be too small if the outbrea
to fast. Another problem is the possibility that the available antiviral drugs will be more or 
less ineffective in treating and protecting against the new pandemic virus. There has already
been widespread circulation of adamantane resistant epidemic influenza (40), and resistance 
has been seen in increasing proportion of H5N1 subtypes. The NA inhibitor oseltamivir has 
been effective against most subtypes of influenza, but resistant virus has been seen, for 
example in immunocompromised hosts (19). Resistance to zanamivir is even more rare.
However, as the virus is not yet here, we cannot know for sure anything about its abilities
change in the genes coding for the NA antigen could in the worst case possibly render the NA 
inhibitors useless. A new virus might also be partially resistant, so that bigger doses of 
oseltamivir is required for one course, and stockpiles may not be sufficiently large. 
Manufacturers of antiviral drugs have committed to considerable increases in produc
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Fergusson et al shows that containment of an emerging pandemic in Southeast Asia is 
possible with prophylactic use of antiviral medication combined with social distancing 
measures if R0 is below 1.8 (5). Another (Longini et al) says that targeted, prophylactic
antiviral agents could contain a pandemic in rural Southeast Asia if R0 is below 1.6 and if the 
intervention took place 2 to 3 weeks after the first case appeared (6). Part of the conclusion of 
yet another study based on models for US and Great Britain is that household-based TAP 
coupled with reactive school closure could reduce clinical attack rates by 40-50%, given 
enough drugs for 50% of the population (11). The WHO urges all countries to develop 
preparedness plans (28), and further planning, research and investigation is still needed 





(HA and NA) or attenuation of live virus. When a susceptible individual is vaccinated, an 
immunological response will produce high titres of antibodies against these specific antige
The same manner a vaccine against human epidemic influenza is manufactured each season, 
health authorities and vaccine manufacturers plan to produce vaccines against a pandemic 
once the causing virus has been isolated (12). This calls for continuous surveillance and a 
great capacity for vaccine-production. But even if the virus could be isolated quickly, the 
production of enough vaccines in country after country will have to take time. Today, mos
vaccines are grown in chicken eggs, future research will possibly find others, more effective
methods of production (8). Norwegian authorities have made an agreement with a vaccine-
producer to deliver 4 million doses within 6 weeks of the start of production (26).  
To mitigate the spread during this first period, other measures are crucial. Some stu
that, in a scenario of a quickly spreading, highly pathogenic influenza virus, the major wave 
of the outbreak might be over before considerable amounts of vaccines would be available (4
11). The time for a vaccine to yield antibody response is also an important factor. According 
to literature, unimmunized individuals should receive two doses of vaccine one month apart, 
to yield a high amount of antibodies (12). As a result, vaccination will prevent disease and 
infectiousness, many studies estimating at least a 50% reduction (26). But because of the 
unknown pathogenicity of the not yet emerged virus more than one dose may be needed to
immunize one person. This might strain the manufacturing capacity (12). The prioritization 
vaccines is important in such a setting; according to The Norwegian Plan for Pandemic 
Preparedness, groups important for vital functions of the society should gain priority (26
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om individual to individual, and among different age 
vaccination will be a powerful weapon to reduce the impact of a pandemic. A study b
German et al concludes that in a pandemic influenza in the USA and for R0 < 1.9, the ra
production and distribution of vaccines (within 2 weeks) could significantly slow disease 
spread and limit the number ill to < 10% of the population (7). Another study by Fergusso
al shows that vaccines stockpiled in advance of a pandemic could significantly reduce attack 
rates even if of low efficacy (a 30% reduction in susceptibility is assumed) (11). 
 In 1976 in Fort Dix, New Jersey, there was an outbreak among soldiers of
influenza. To prevent a possible catastrophic pandemic, the Government an Centre for 
Disease Control manufactured a vaccine and 43 million Americans were vaccinated. Th
outbreak turned out to be much more limited than expected, and when the vaccine proved 
cause incidents of severe adverse effects, the immunization program was assailed as a fiasco 
(13). But as most scientists agree that it's just a matter of time before the next pandemic 
influenza hits us, this example illustrates the degree of sustained surveillance, resolute 
decisiveness and effective vaccine manufacturing such a vaccination program will need
effective.  
 Som
against internal structures in the virus. This will possibly lead to a more powerful and long
lasting vaccine because many internal structures are not subjected to such a strong mutation
pressure as is the case with surface antigens (21). Others conclude that immunity against 
internal structures is either short lived or plays a relatively small role in resistance (12). Th
reason is that after having stopped circulating in 1957, the H1N1 virus reappeared in 1977, 
and significant disease was only seen in people born after 1957. People previously infected 
with H1N1 had antibodies against HA an NA surface antigens, and showed immunity to a 
large extent. Younger people, never infected with H1N1, but several times with other 





of the many barriers reducing potential viral transmission is being changed. Ever growing 
urbanization will, at least in some parts of the population, increase the contact rates. Schoo
public transport, social gatherings etc bring people closer together and facilitates transmission.
While increased prosperity and wealth might increase the hygiene, increasing travel and trade 
can ease regional spread of virus. And the exploding increase in air travel has undoubtedly led 
to a greater risk for inter-regional and -continental spread (38). 
 In case of an emerging highly pathogenic avian influenza
health officials will have to introduce measures to reduce the contact rates in the population. 
Facing a possible emerging pandemic, people will also change their behaviour spontaneously
and probably reduce the risk of transmission (5). 
 As with antiviral drugs and vaccination, th
finding out which ones are the most effective. Economic loss and increased public expenses
must also be taken under consideration.  
 Contact rates vary substantially fr
groups and subpopulations. Children are believed to have high contact rates, and the closing 
of schools and kindergartens might be an effective measure. But the result will be increased 
contact between children and adults, Fergusson et al assumes household and random contact 
rates to increase by 100% and 50%, respectively, for individuals no longer able to attend 
school or work (5). There is also an economic cost having a large part of the adult populat
looking after kids at home. Another option is travel restrictions: reducing public transport, 
inter-regional or international travelling. In a setting of a severe pandemic, quarantines coul
be an alternative, Fergusson et al suggests quarantine zones, in which movements in and out 
of the affected area is restricted (5).  
 Other measures includes for e
ion 
d 




increasing hygiene routines etc, especially relevant in hospitals. Simple measures such a
thorough hand washing could be among the most efficient. It is hard to predict the effects o
social measures (5). Although clinical data are limited, and expected levels of compliance is 
only moderate, studies conclude that social measures will work and should be subject to 
further investigation (37, 38). An important factor will in any case be the means of 







ATTEMPTS TO DETERMINE R0 IN EPIDEMIC 
INFLUENZA IN NORWAY 
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Almost every paper released in this subject relates at least part of their discussion to this 
quantity. Several studies aims at estimating R0-values of the Flu Pandemics of the last 
century. This is of great interest, because R0 quantifies the potency of the pathogen to s
in the population under consideration. Knowledge of how earlier pandemic viruses spread can
help us prepare for the next.  
 Trying to estimate R0-
have a lot of experience and data about seasonal outbreaks, and an estimation of R0 will help 
understanding these outbreaks. This, in turn, yields valuable information about how a 
pandemic virus will spread. At least in the beginning of an outbreak, a pandemic virus 
probably meet the same conditions as seasonal influenza.  
 Norwegian Primary Physicians covering 15% of No
about influenza to FHI (Folkehelseinstituttet), the Norwegian Centre for Disease Control. 
Each physician report weekly the total numbers of consultations as well as the number of 
consultations where the patient had symptoms of Influenza Like Illness (ILI). These data w
collected through six "influenza seasons" from 1998 through 2004, each season lasting from 
week 40 to week 20 the following year. We used these numbers to estimate the proportion of 
the population having influenza in the following way: 
 We summed up all ILI-numbers for each week a
consultations each season. Throughout a year we assume that there is a certain number of 
consultations where the patient has ILI symptoms, but no actual influenza. For that reason,
subtracted a basal rate from each weekly total of ILI, so that the weekly number of ILI is close 
to zero at the beginning of the outbreak, as defined by the FHI. In all cases this was during 
late fall or winter.  
 Then we divided each adjusted number of weekly ILI with that seasons total 
consultations. In this estimate, the number of ILI-symptoms noted by the physician represents 
the number of influenza cases, and the total number of consultations represents the 
population. 
 Figure 1.1 shows these data, the curves reflecting each seasonal influenza outbreak. 
We imported these curves into a statistical program named Berkley-Madonna, and 
constructed an SEIR model as described above. The program (curve fitting) fitted the values 
infectious period, latency period, initially infected, initially immune and the contact rates so 
that the infectious curve from the SEIR model matched the curve from the data set the best 






























figure 1.1. Weekly numbers of each season's observed ILI, after having subtracted the basal 






 Figures 1.2 and 1.4 shows for the seasons 98-99 and 99-00, respectively, the results of 
this curve fitting and the estimated values of R0, latency period and infectious period. Figures 
1.3 and 1.5 shows for the same two seasons the number of susceptibles and cumulated 




























































Time in weeks 
figure 1.2. ILI-data from the 98-99 season (black), the fitted curve in the SEIR-model (green) 
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figure 1.3. The number of susceptibles (black) and cumulated infected (blue) throughout the 
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figure 1.4. ILI-data from the 99-00 season (red), the fitted curve in the SEIR-model(green) 

























































Time in weeks 
figure 1.5. The number of susceptibles (black) and cumulated infected (blue) throughout the 
modelled outbreak in the 99-00 season. 
Results 
 








98-99 1.34 0.58 0.62 0.17 0.15 
99-00 1.24 0.52 0.54 0.10 0.18 
00-01 1.17 0.32 0.57 0.10 0.06 
01-02 1.18 0.59 0.39 0.10 0.095 
02-03 1.04 0.35 0.41 0.02 0.032 
03-04 1.24 0.50 0.42 0.11 0.17 






The method described above for estimating R0 of epidemic influenza in Norway is not very 
robust. There are several factors contributing to possible errors. First I will discuss 
uncertainties about the data and how they are collected and treated.  
 Influenza is a well known disease, but it is not easy to diagnose it clinically. A lot of 
other conditions including for example other viral infections and allergy, can yield symptoms 
as coughing, sneezing, sore throat or fever, while headache, myalgia, nausea etc is mostly 
subjectively recognized. Hence, the physicians diagnosis of ILI does not have an optimal 
specificity as an estimate of true influenza incidence. This problem is possibly even larger 
during an influenza outbreak: when there is an increased focus on influenza, the physician and 
the patients will more often think that influenza causes the symptoms. It is believed that 
during an influenza season, there will be many sub-clinical cases not recognized by the doctor 
as influenza. Hence, the sensitivity is not optimal either.  
 Another problem is that far from all persons on a Primary Physicians list visit the 
doctor during a season. These are primarily healthy people, but even people with clinical 
influenza might not go see the doctor, and many cases of ILI will be left out. These effects 
might counter-balance each other, but this is still a source of great uncertainty. 
 The data-gathering might seem satisfactory if one considers the group of patients 
consulting the physician during the season as a representative part of all the persons on that 
physicians list. But even if that was true, there would still be the mentioned problem of 
specificity and sensitivity. Patients with more than one consultation will be counted more than 
once, and patients without ILI at their consultation might still have had ILI during the season.  
 To conclude, the ILI-registration system might not be a very good estimate of the total 
incidence of influenza, but so far, these are the best data available. The FHI also register the 
positive proportion of serological samples taken from patients with ILI by some physicians 
and hospitals, but this procedure does not yet include enough patients to be of any certain 
value.  
 The procedure of subtracting a basal rate from all the weekly ILI-numbers might also 
be a source of error. It is, however, believed that outside influenza season there are as good as 
no cases of influenza and the basal rate subtraction might therefore correct some of the 
mentioned lack of specificity.   
 Secondly, methods for modelling the spread and calculations of R0 might contribute to 
errors. The SIR and SEIR models are widely respected for modelling outbreaks of infectious 
disease. However, most modern models are far more sophisticated, including different states 
and subpopulations. A simple SEIR model as used in this method might not simulate the real 
epidemic in a satisfactory way. The model does not take into account the variations in contact 
rates and disease intensity among different subpopulations. It is based on a hypothetical 
society where all inhabitants are average persons and mixes with everyone. The benefits by 
using a simple model is that in absence of too many assumptions, the model is more robust 
and easier to interpret.  
 As mentioned under Mathematical modelling, R0 is a theoretical value describing the 
pandemic potential in the beginning of the outbreak. The method used here, by building an 
SEIR model on constant values of β and γ, is a potential source of error. β in particular, but 
also γ, might in reality vary during the outbreak, giving another curve and possibly another 
R0.  
 Finally, there was some trouble regarding the curve-fitting function in Berkley-
Madonna. The program required limits and suggestions to the variables, to which the curve-
fitting seemed quite sensitive. Experimenting with these limits led to the realization that if a 
SEIR model curve was to fit the data set, some of the variables had to take values far from 
what we would expect. The R0 values between 1,04 and 1,34 seems quite reasonable, 
according to literature (15). But the latency and infectious periods got generally to short, both 
less than 24 hours in our simulations. According to literature, the incubation or latency period 
is from 1 to 4 days (mean 2) and the infectious time from 3 to 5 days or even longer (18, 26, 
31).  
 To conclude, there are many sources of error in this project. Especially the 
combination of uncertain data-gathering and processing, along with a too simplified model 
and method of R0-calculation. This makes the results too uncertain to be conclusive, but still 
they could be of some use. For example: although supported by clinical observations, the 
commonly accepted values of latency and infectious periods is based on few solid sources. In 
a PubMed search for "influenza" and "incubation" I found an article (26) referring to another 
(31) which had no references for its stated values of incubation period. Further investigation 
and research in different fields is needed to learn more about influenza, as exemplified here 
by modelling of seasonal influenza outbreaks and estimation of its values of R0, latency 




MODELLING AN OUTBREAK 
 
Method and discussion 
 
Each year, in the subject of pandemic influenza, tenfold of articles are published in 
internationally respected journals and magazines. Many of these use mathematical modelling 
as part of their discussion and theories. As already discussed briefly, simple models might be 
too simplified to represent reality. On the other hand, generalizations and assumptions have to 
be made even in the most advanced models, and the more complex a model is, the more 
difficult is the interpretation. Nevertheless, most studies use models with a complicated 
structure and apply a number of data from knowledge of the society and the pathogens (4, 5, 
6, 7). Some of them apply SEIR-like models as part of the structure in their methods (4, 6). 
Examples of methods used is the construction of a small society based on census studies, with 
different sizes of households, schools, workplaces etc. Dependent on age and other 
characteristics, individuals have different contact patterns and probabilities to catch disease. 
Other parameters, as for example the probability that an infected case is asymptomatic, or that 
an infected individual changes his contact pattern, are also taken into account. As a result, 
complex data programs are constructed and powerful computers are needed to run 
calculations (4). These studies often require months of work by many people from several 
departments. 
 I have chosen to present modelling with the SEIR model in its simplest form. 
Although far from methods applied in modern studies, it exemplifies mathematical modelling 
in an understandable way. I used the program Mathematica to construct a SEIR model as 
explained earlier. The program illustrates graphically different scenarios of an influenza 
pandemic, depending on the values of contact rate, infectious period and incubation period as 
well as total population and the initial numbers of infected and resistant. As already 
mentioned, the characteristics of a not yet emerged pandemic is of course not known. Based 
on observations, calculations and knowledge of the virus and the society we can have good 
guesses for different variables, but when preparing for a pandemic it is essential to do 
modelling of different scenarios. Through vaccination, medication and implementation of 
social measures one can change factors determining the course of the pandemic. Between 
writers of different scientific studies, there are substantial discussion about the probable sizes 
of all these factors. I have manipulated the factors R0, contact rate, latency period, infectious 
period and the proportion of initially resistant, all according to numbers figuring in large 
studies. My modelling are meant to serve as examples of how mathematical modelling can be 
of great value in preparing for a pandemic. In all the following simulations, the total 
population is set to 1000 individuals, and the time unit is days.  
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                                                                      Time 
figure 2.1. SEIR model (green, brown, red, blue). The curves show the number of persons in 
each state each day. Latency period is set to 2 days, infectious period 5 days, contact rate 0.5, 
R0 = 2.5.  
 
In the scenario of figure 2.1., where R0 is 2.5, the peak of the outbreak would occur at 
approximately 42 days after the first cases with 16.5% of the population infected at the same 
time. A total of about 90% would go through infection, and the whole outbreak would be over 
after 80 days. Most studies estimate an R0 of less than 3 for the Spanish Flu, and even lower 
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figure 2.2. SEIR models (green, brown, red, blue). The curves show the number of persons in 
each state each day. Latency period 2 days, infectious period 5 days. Left: contact rate 0.35, 
R0 = 1.75. Right: contact rate 0.25, R0 = 1.25.  
 
To get a closer look at how these different values of R0 will influence the outbreak, figures 
2.3 and 2.4 displays the Infected curves and the Recovered curves, respectively, from SEIR 
models with the three different values of R0, namely 2.5, 1.75 and 1.25. As R0 drops, the 
peak of the outbreak is both delayed and reduced substantially, and the same holds for the 
number of cumulated infections. Such differences in R0 can result from the nature of the 
pandemic virus, the contact pattern in the population, and the effect of organized measures to 
contain or mitigate the pandemic. 
 These curves can help illustrating many aspects of a pandemic. Combined with the 
expected proportion of lethal cases among the infected, one can estimate the number of excess 
deaths. Similarly, one can estimate for example the size of workplace absenteeism or the 
increased burden expected to hit the health care system. 
 
 Figure 2.5.and 2.6. further illustrates how changes in the latency period and R0 may 
change the outbreak. The 25% reduction in the infectious period refers to the Norwegian 
Pandemic Preparedness plan where it is stated that Tamiflu reduces the infectious period by 1 
to 2 days (26). Note that doubling the latency period postpones the peak of the outbreak but 
the number of cumulated infections is not reduced. A relatively small reduction in infectious 

















                                                                          Time 
figure 2.3.Comparing infected-curves from three different SEIR simulations, each with a 
different value of R0. Whole line: R0 2.5; Large dotted line: R0 1.75; Small dotted line: R0 
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figure 2.4. Comparing recovered-curves from three different SEIR simulations, each with a 
different value of R0. Whole line: R0 2.5; Large dotted line: R0 1.75; Small dotted line: R0 
1.25. Each curve shows the daily number of recovered, corresponding to the number of 
cumulated infections. 
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                                                                             Time 
figure 2.5. Comparing infected-curves from three different SEIR simulations. Whole line: R0 
1.75, latency period 2 days, infectious period 5 days, contact rate 0.35. Large dotted line: 
Doubling the latency period to 4 days, R0, infectious period and contact rate unchanged. 
Small dotted line: Reducing the infectious period with 25%, R0 ~ 1.31. Latency period 2 days, 
contact rate unchanged.  
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figure 2.6. Comparing curves of cumulated infected from three different SEIR simulations. 
Same conditions as figure 2.5.  
 
 
Every season of epidemic influenza, some individuals are (partly) immune after having gone 
through infection with a similar virus. It is believed that this proportion will be negligible 
during a pandemic, but protective measures could result in corresponding conditions. One 
example is prophylaxis with antiviral drugs, another is vaccination of parts of the population 
(provided that time allows production and distribution of a vaccine before the pandemic hits). 
Figure 2.7. shows that increasing the proportion of initially resistant from 10% to 20% 
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figure 2.7. SEIR models. Contact rate 0.35, infectious period 0.5, R0 1.75. Left: 10% of the 







The world must be prepared for the next influenza pandemic, although no one knows when, 
and how hard, it will hit. Massive outbreaks of avian influenza H5N1 in the poultry industry 
the last years as well as sporadic transmission to humans, might indicate that this subtype 
constitute the biggest pandemic threat in several decades. Much is already done, but future 
research, surveillance and planning must continue. The role of WHO and each country's 
national health authorities is crucial to coordinate these efforts.  
 In this paper, I have discussed mathematical modelling as an indispensible tool in 
epidemiology. Mathematical modelling form the backbone in many studies about pandemic 
influenza. Some studies conclude that a pandemic can be contained if measures including 
prophylactic use of antiviral medication are initiated swiftly. Others show that vaccines can be 
of great importance. I have talked about mathematically defined quantities, such as R0, that 
make comparing different scenarios possible. 
 The results of R0 estimations from Norwegian numbers of seasonal influenza are too 
uncertain due to many possible sources of error in the method, but part of the results seems 
reliable. Primarily, this work illustrates how mathematical methods are used in research and 
planning in the field of influenza epidemiology. The same holds for my last work, where I use 
SEIR models to demonstrate different scenarios for the course of a pandemic.  
 Pandemic Influenza Preparedness involves many occupational groups and statisticians 
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